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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a spatial model of coalition formation with
data from Dutch elections and with theoretical results. First, we study
different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that
procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement
and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a first-
mover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party’s flexibility
can be beneficial in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, we find that
certain power sharing tactics do not always lead to an agreement that
is in a party’s advantage. The main message put forward is that the
process of coalition formation plays a more important role than is
usually acknowledged in literature and practice.
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1 Introduction
In multi-party democracies, political parties have to form coalitions to achieve
majority governments. As a part of coalition negotiations, coalition members
bargain and agree on a package of policy agreements, the coalition agreement
(Timmermans, 2003, provides an extensive discussion on coalition agree-
ments). In 63% of the coalition formations in Western-Europe studied by
Mu¨ller and Strøm (2003), such coalition agreements were reached (in e.g.
Austria, Ireland, Belgium, and The Netherlands). In order to reach such a
coalition agreement, parties in the coalition will have to make compromises
as each party has its own ideal policy. Only by adjusting their policy posi-
tions, parties can reach the compromise needed for the coalition agreement.
This flexibility of political parties in the negotiations on coalition agreements
is one of the central subjects of this paper.
The second central subject is the procedure used to reach a coalition.
Roughly speaking, two different ways of coalition formation can be dis-
cerned: a step-by-step or hierarchical procedure versus a simultaneous or
non-hierarchical procedure (Laver & Schofield, 1990). The step-by-step ap-
proach sees coalition formation as a process in which the group incrementally
forms: new members are added gradually. An alternative approach is to nego-
tiate immediately with all the members of the coalition, as in a simultaneous
procedure. In spite of these two different procedures which are recognized
in the literature and which both occur in real life coalition formation, little
attention has been paid to the consequences of these procedures for the result
of coalition formation. However, some earlier theoretical results show that
procedure plays an important role in coalition formation and that, except
for some special situation, different procedures lead to different results (De
Ridder & Rusinowska, 2008). The special conditions require that the ideal
positions of the players are really close, which is unrealistic in a political
setting.
In this paper, we study the two dynamical aspects of coalition forma-
tion just discussed (procedure and policy flexibility). We study those two
aspects by analyzing a formal model and deducing implications from this
model based on real-life data. The model was introduced earlier in De Rid-
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der and Rusinowska (2008), where a formal presentation of the model and
the different procedures are found. The model is positioned among spatial
coalition models (based on Downs, 1957, see e.g. Grofman, 1982; Laver &
Shepsle, 1996). In De Ridder and Rusinowska (2008), the model has been
applied to alliance formation between firms. In Sa´iz, Hendrix, De Ridder
and Rusinowska (2007), the computational aspects of both the model and
the empirical test are discussed. Here, we focus on the model implications
concerning coalition formation dynamics by using the model to arrive at ex-
amples based on data from Dutch elections. Based on our findings, we discuss
the implications for political science.
This article aims at a contribution in the field of political science, in
particular, in formal and spatial coalition modeling. The field of research
of formal coalition models is large and extensive, see, amongst others, Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), Axelrod (1970), Grofman (1982), Van
Deemen (1989), Laver and Shepsle (1996), Warwick (1998), De Vries (1999)
and Martin and Stevenson (2001). So far, most of those studies have focussed
on why coalition form and, based on that, which parties will cooperate. Ar-
guments for coalition formation were found in power, policy, or institutional
arguments. However, the strategy and process of coalition formation have
been ignored in the literature (Laver & Schofield, 1990): how will coalitions
be formed, and, what is the best strategy for a party during the process
of coalition formation? Also, from a more formal theoretical point of view,
several authors have pointed at this lack of dynamics in the models (Van
Deemen, 1997; Tohme´ & Sandholm, 1999; Arnold & Schwalbe, 2002). It
seems unnatural to analyze coalition formation with a static approach, since
coalition formation is clearly dynamic in nature: for example, parties need
a few weeks, sometimes months, to reach a coalition agreement, different
procedures are used to form a coalition, and parties move their positions to
be able to compromise. The suggestion that process plays a role in coali-
tion formation - and should thus be included as an explanatory variable -
is strengthened by earlier research (Austen-Smith & Banks, 1988; Baron,
1993; Bloch, 1996; Brams, Jones, & Kilgour, 2005; De Ridder & Rusinowska,
2008). This earlier research has not evolved towards a coherent and empir-
ically verified stream of research, and, moreover, the role of procedure has
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been ignored.
In this article, we aim to make two major points and one minor point
concerning the strategies political parties should adopt during the process
of coalition negotiations. The first major point is to stress the role of coali-
tion formation procedure. Two different procedures of coalition formation,
leading to different coalition positions, are under study. Earlier research on
coalition formation has mainly neglected the role of procedure in coalition for-
mation (e.g. Martin & Stevenson, 2001, exceptions are Bloch, 1996; Brams,
Jones, & Kilgour, 2005). We validate earlier theoretical results (De Ridder &
Rusinowska, 2008) of the important role for procedure and we focus on the
first-mover advantage. The question is whether being a first-mover is always
advantageous for a party in coalition negotiations, as in real-life the biggest
party, after elections, is most often rewarded with the initiative for coalition
negotiations.
As a second major point, we focus on policy flexibility of parties. One
of the central assumptions of our model is that parties have maneuvering
spaces which reflect their flexibility to deviate from their ideal positions.
No party will accept a coalition position which lies outside its maneuvering
space. This assumption is similar to the one made in a policy-horizon model
by Warwick (2000, 2005a, 2005b). Warwick examines the hypothesis that
coalition government formation in West European parliaments is constrained
by the existence of limits or bounds (called policy horizons) on the extent to
which parties can compromise on their policy positions in order to participate
in government. While Warwick focuses on developing methods to estimate
these policy horizons and on applying the methods to data on West European
parliamentary systems, our aim is different. In this article we neither aim
at estimating the maneuvering spaces nor at forecasting which coalition will
form, rather we focus on the process to reach a coalition and the strategies
the parties should adopt in this process. The question we pose is whether
being flexible in coalition negotiations is advantageous for parties. Is a party
better off by being more or less flexible?
Additionally, we want to study a minor point: the role of sharing power.
The question here is whether striving for a coalition in which a party gets the
best relative power position is always advantageous. Earlier empirical results
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confirm the role of power-sharing motives of parties (Martin & Stevenson,
2001), but do not show that oversized can be an advantage for coalition
members (cf. Volden & Carruba, 2004 who explain when oversized coalitions
occur). Sub-issues here are the minimal winning argument (Von Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1944) and the influence of weight. The minimal winning
argument states that only coalitions will form that have enough members
to be winning, but not more than that. But is a minimal winning coalition
necessarily advantageous for a party? Or, more general, is a smaller coali-
tion necessarily more advantageous than an oversized coalition? Concerning
weight, we like to consider the consequence the weight of a party (number of
seats in parliament) has for its coalitional partners. The last research ques-
tion is then: Does an increase of a party’s weight imply a disadvantage for
its coalition partners?
Those questions are answered by deducing implications from the theo-
retical model presented. We have performed calculations with the model
using data from Dutch politics, and, moreover, we present some theoreti-
cal results. Both the empirical and theoretical calculations provide some
counter-intuitive situations which show that certain expectations do not al-
ways hold. Also, we illustrate that certain traditions in real-life coalition
formation are not necessarily advantageous.
During the paper, we study which strategic moves are advantageous for a
potential coalition member. Advantageous is defined in terms of preference of
a party over a coalition and the path to reach this coalition. This is measured
by taking the distance from the ideal position of the party to the position of
the coalition compromise. The closer the coalition position, the better. The
policy-distance effect on government composition, meaning that the incentive
of a party to join a parliamentary coalition government decreases with the
distance between the policy position and the position of the government, was
elaborated and tested in particular by Warwick (1998).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background. We start with recapitulating the model of coalition formation
(Section 2.1). Subsequently, the three issues and their theoretical expecta-
tions are discussed: the procedures of forming a coalition (Section 2.2), the
flexibility of parties (Section 2.3), and the role of power sharing (Section 2.4).
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In Section 3, we elaborate on Dutch data and the way we calculate in the
model. Section 4 shows counter examples with empirical and theoretical data
studying the hypotheses. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion of
the findings and implications for theory and practice.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 The model
We deal with the following model of spatial coalition formation, considered in
De Ridder and Rusinowska (2008). There are n players, here political parties,
which try to form a majority coalition S and to decide about a policy of the
coalition xS hereafter called the coalition position. This coalition position
is the formal representation of the policy agreement of a coalition. Party
i ∈ N , where N denotes the set of all parties, has a weight wi > 0, which is
based on the number of seats in parliament party i possesses.
Each party i may choose a policy position xi from an m-multidimensional
Euclidean policy space Rm, m ≥ 1. A distance between two positions xi =
(xi1, ..., xim) and xj = (xj1, ..., xjm) is given by
d(xi, xj) =
√√√√ m∑
k=1
(xik − xjk)2. (1)
Parties have a certain amount of flexibility on the policy positions, i.e.,
they have their preferences defined in Rm. Each player i ∈ N is assumed to
have an ideal position x∗i ∈ Rm, which is the most preferred position of party
i, and a maneuvering space, an equivalent of the policy horizon by Warwick
(2000), which consists of all positions acceptable to party i. We assume the
maneuvering space to be a ball in Rm. By Mi we denote the maneuvering
space of party i with middle point x∗i and radius ri, i.e.,
Mi = {y ∈ Rm | d(x∗i , y) ≤ ri}. (2)
The maneuvering space of a party is then the set of policy positions with
distances from the ideal position of the party not greater than the radius.
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Of course, some positions are more preferred to a party than others.
Preferences of a party on positions are expressed by the following rule: the
closer a position is to the ideal position of a party, the more preferred this
position is to the party.
Given coalition S ⊆ N and the ideal positions x∗i for i ∈ S, all parties
of the potential coalition S have to agree on a coalition position for S. In
the next subsection, we recapitulate two alternative procedures for forming
a coalition and choosing a coalition position for that coalition. Although the
procedures differ from each other, there are two common assumptions for
these procedures. First of all, it is assumed that no party will agree on a
position which does not belong to its maneuvering space as these positions
are unacceptable for a party. In other words, the necessary condition for
a coalition S to be formed is a non-empty intersection of the maneuvering
spaces of all members of S (we call this a feasible coalition), i.e.,⋂
i∈S
Mi 6= ∅,
and of course, the position xS of the formed coalition S must belong to this
intersection as there has to be commonality in positions, i.e.,
xS ∈
⋂
i∈S
Mi.
A similar assumption is adopted in the policy-horizon model: ‘With hori-
zons, there are definite limits to the willingness of parties to compromise
on policy in order to participate in government; beyond those limits, parties
would prefer to remain in opposition’ (Warwick, 2000, p. 39). An illustration
of the model in a three-party, two dimensional example is given in Figure 1.
2.2 Procedures
Now, our approach takes a different course from the one adopted by War-
wick. To find a solution to our basic coalition formation model, we consider
and compare two procedures: a step-by-step procedure and a simultaneous
procedure. These two procedures coincide with the distinction in political
science literature between hierarchal and non-hierarchal coalition formation
7
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Figure 1: Illustration of the model.
(Laver & Schofield, 1990). So far, spatial coalition theories have most often
neglected the different procedure of forming a coalition (as in Grofman, 1982
who studies one procedure, but see Bloch, 1996, and Brams et al., 2005,
who do consider the consequences of different procedures). In De Ridder
and Rusinowska (2008), it has formally been proven that it matters which
procedure is adopted, and also that there is no procedure which is always
better.
The first kind of procedure, the hierarchal view, sees ‘ ... coalition building
as a process in which actors with similar policy preferences first get together
in some sort of provisional alliance and, only after this has been done ..., do
they cast around for other coalition partners, adding these until the formation
criterion is satisfied’ (Laver & Schofield, 1990, p. 140). The proto-coalition
model of Grofman (1982) is such a hierarchial model. In the model we present
here, the step-by-step procedure is a hierarchical procedure. Although it is
difficult to look behind the often closed doors of coalition negotiations, e.g.
Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark have known instances of this step-by-step
approach (Mu¨ller & Strøm, 2003).
In the step-by-step procedure, the first step is that two parties (e.g. party
1 and 2) negotiate. These two will reach an agreement if their maneuvering
spaces overlap and hence a first coalition position x{1,2} is agreed on. This
coalition position is determined by choosing a position in the intersection of
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their maneuvering spaces and taking the weights of the players into account.
That is, a big party can pull the coalition position more towards its ideal.
To be more precise, when determining x{1,2}, first, parties 1 and 2 each
choose a position (called the negotiation position) in the intersection of the
maneuvering spaces such that the distance of that position to the ideal point
of the party is minimal. These negotiation positions are denoted with x˜1 and
x˜2. The coalition position x{1,2} is the gravity center (a weighted average) of
the negotiation positions.
Now, a third party (3) joins the negotiations. Players 1 and 2 operate
as proto-coalition {1,2}, and an agreement with 3 is only reached if the
maneuvering spaces of 1, 2, and 3 overlap. If so, coalition {1, 2, 3} with
position x{{1,2},3} is formed, which is the gravity center of the negotiation
positions of the proto-coalition {1, 2} and party 3. This process continues
with adding new parties until a majority coalition S with position xS has
been reached, where S denotes an order, a set of parties, that indicates the
sequence that leads to coalition S. In De Ridder and Rusinowska (2008),
it has been proven that this step-by-step procedure leads to a unique and
Pareto efficient solution. Hence, one coalition position is reached such that
there is no other position in the intersection of the maneuvering spaces that
is more preferred by all members of the coalition. An illustration of the
step-by-step procedure of forming a three-party coalition is given in Figure
2.
Second, we also find a non-hierarchial approach which considers coalition
formation as a one-step procedure. Laver and Shepsle (1996) generalize polit-
ical coalition formation as a process in which one party proposes a particular
cabinet, which can be vetoed by all its members. In such a case, there are no
proto-coalitions which form intermediate steps before a definitive coalition
is reached. Non-hierarchical coalition formation is a process in which all the
parties of a coalition sit round the table to negotiate simultaneously. In the
overview of coalition formation in Western-Europe, Mu¨ller and Strøm (2003)
report many instances of such a way of bargaining.
In our model, the simultaneous procedure looks as follows. If parties 1, 2,
and 3 form coalition {1, 2, 3}, their coalition position is x{1,2,3}. A coalition
forms if maneuvering spaces of all three parties overlap. Again, the coalition
9
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Figure 2: The step-by-step procedure
position will be in the intersection of their three maneuvering spaces and
will depend on the weights of the players. The position x{1,2,3} is the gravity
center of the negotiation positions of all parties in question. More general, the
simultaneous procedure of forming a majority coalition S results in a position
xS of the coalition. Again, it has also been proven that this procedure leads to
a unique and Pareto optimal solution (De Ridder & Rusinowska, 2008). An
illustration of the simultaneous procedure of forming a three-party coalition
is given in Figure 3.
Beware that although both the step-by-step procedure and the simulta-
neous procedure can study a coalition with for instance parties 1, 2, and 3,
their respective outcomes are usually different (an exception and special case
is when the ideal positions of two parties starting the coalition formation
process belong to the intersection of the maneuvering spaces of the three
parties, the step-by-step procedure with the given parties’ order of forming a
coalition, and the simultaneous procedure lead to the same position for the
coalition.). According to the step-by-step procedure, this coalition {1, 2, 3}
can form in three different ways: first a bilateral agreement with two parties
and then the third party 1, 2 or 3 respectively joins. The simultaneous pro-
cedure predicts just one way of forming the coalition: all negotiate together.
Hence, in spite of a cooperation between the same three parties, four different
paths to form a coalition and four different coalition positions are discerned:
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x{{1,2},3}, x{{1,3},2}, x{{2,3},1}, and x{1,2,3}.
Calculations have shown that the number of different paths and coalition
positions can increase dramatically. In a coalition game with ten parties, 210−
11 = 1013 different 10-party coalitions are possible. However, when taking
different procedures into account, 4932045 different step-by-step coalitions
can be discerned plus 1013 simultaneously formed coalitions. In sum, if ten
parties play a coalition game, there are 4933058 different ways of forming a
coalition. This number is calculated from the following formula:(
10
2
)
+
1
2
10∑
k=3
(
10
k
)
k!.
.
Disregarding some special conditions, the two procedures usually lead to
different positions for the coalition and consequently different appreciations
by the coalition members. Given the distance between the ideal position
of a party and the coalition position, parties will have a preference ranking
over the different positions of the coalitions, over the different coalitions, and
hence over the procedures to reach them. The closer a coalition agreement is
to the ideal position of a party, the more this party will prefer this coalition
agreement. In this way, we show that parties should not only form preferences
over coalitions, but should also take the procedure into consideration. In
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conclusion, the procedure of coalition formation should be a strategic resource
in coalition formation and should play a role in coalition negotiations similar
to the composition of the coalition.
However, empirical observations of how coalitions form show that proce-
dures are usually not used as a strategic resource, but procedure is rather the
result of unwritten laws and traditions (e.g. Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg,
and The Netherlands, Mu¨ller & Strøm, 2003). An important observation
is that in many multi-party democracies, it is a habit that the party that
came out of the elections as the largest to get the initiative (from a head
of state) for forming a coalition (Isaksson, 2005). Examples of countries in
which this (more or less frequently) happens are The Netherlands, Sweden,
Finland, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg (Mu¨ller & Strøm, 2003). The
idea behind this is that these initiative taking parties are supposed to lead
the negotiations and to have an advantage in the bargaining situation. Re-
search of Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss, and Ting (2005) shows that the
party forming the coalition government indeed receives a substantial bonus
relative to its weight concerning the ministers posts its gets as compared
to parties that join the coalition, but which did not form. Also concerning
policy rewards, the earlier a party is involved in coalition negotiations, the
more this party is able to pull the negotiations towards its own ideas. In this
way, this party can determine and influence the negotiations more and can
get advantage out of it. This brings us to the first hypothesis:
H1: Being a first-mover in coalition negotiations is advantageous.
2.3 Flexibility
The second important aspect of our model is the flexibility during negotia-
tions we attribute parties via maneuvering spaces. To negotiate in the parlia-
mentary arena, political parties use input from the electoral arena: both the
amount of seats a party has gained after elections and the multi-dimensional
policy positions they have taken during the elections. The assumption is that,
in the parliamentary arena, these policy positions are also multi-dimensional.
We will question another assumption often made in the literature of coalition
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formation models, namely that political parties have a fixed position in pol-
icy space (Grofman, 1982; De Vries, 1999). Both during elections (Enelow &
Hinich, 1984; Budge, 1994; Van der Brug, 1999; Laver, 2005) and coalition
negotiations (Warwick, 2000), the policy position of a party is more subject
to change than is usually assumed. Both in the parliamentary and electoral
arena, ‘...positions are not frozen or fixed; parties move in the policy space
in different directions over time’ (Timmermans, 2003, p. 9). Here, we focus
on dynamics of policy positions in the coalition formation phase.
The idea is that in order to form a coalition, political parties will move
their policy position, but only to a certain limit (Warwick, 2000) as for-
malized in our model by the maneuvering space. Coalition formation implies
making a coalition agreement: a compromise between the members of a coali-
tion on the ideological course of the coalition, consisting of a position for the
coalition. As a consequence, parties participating in a coalition need to ad-
just their position in order to reach such an agreement (Martin & Vanberg,
2004). It is not likely that parties will cooperate with a party which has
opposing policy ideals. We therefore assume parties will only be willing to
compromise if they can stay within their maneuvering space of acceptable
positions.
The question now rises what is mostly in a party’s interest: a big or
small maneuvering space? When forming a two-party coalition, the answer
is straightforward: being less flexible is never disadvantageous. If a coalition
consists of only two parties, the more flexible party of the two will be forced
to move its position more than the other. One can speak of a zero-sum
situation: what one wins, is lost by the other.
Nonetheless, when forming a k-party coalition, for k ≥ 3, the answer
is less easy. Intuitively, one would consider that staying closer to a party’s
ideal position is also better in multi-party coalitions. Hence, a decrease in
flexibility would always be in a party’s advantage. However, this is less easy
to analyze due to the amount of players involved. Therefore, we use the data
and theoretical results to study whether the following (second) hypothesis
holds:
H2: Being less flexible in coalition negotiations is more advantageous.
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2.4 Sharing power
As a final point, we study the role of sharing power. Coalition formation
has long been considered as a combination of achieving power, and simul-
taneously sharing this power with coalition partners. Coalition formation is
therefore a delicate balance between on the one hand getting this power by
compromising into the coalition, and on the other hand, forming a coalition
which gives a party relatively the best power. In this tradition, the mini-
mal winning (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and minimum size theory
(Riker, 1962) have been formulated.
In the introduction, it was already explained that minimal winning coali-
tions are coalitions that contain enough members to be winning, but are not
oversized. Minimal winning coalitions cannot miss any member without be-
coming losing. Minimum size coalitions contain enough weight to be winning,
but not more than that.
In line with this, one could reason that oversized coalitions imply shar-
ing power with more partners and hence compromising with more partners
than necessary. The chance is bigger that a coalition position will be reached
which is farther from a party’s ideal position. Less members in a coalition
make it easier to reach an agreement which is closer to a party’s ideal point.
Hence hypothesis 3a:
H3a: Being in a smaller (winning) coalition is more advantageous
than being in an oversized coalition.
In a similar way, we can argue that forming a coalition with a stronger
partner is not advantageous, since the stronger party may ‘pull’ the position
of a formed coalition more towards it’s own ideal position. Hence we propose
hypothesis 3b:
H3b: Increase of a party’s weight is disadvantageous for its
coalition partners.
14
3 Empirical illustration
From the model discussed in the theoretical background section, we have
highlighted three aspects: the procedures, flexibility of parties, and power
sharing. Different procedures can lead to different positions and hence are
crucial for the result of coalition formation. Also, the degree of flexibility
of a party is important for the results of coalition formation. Power sharing
has always been considered an important element of coalition formation. To
study these issues, we perform calculations with the model using data from
Dutch elections, next to some theoretical results. The aim is not to provide an
empirical test of the model, but to arrive at model implications, partly based
on real-life counter-examples, which tell us whether the posed hypotheses
always hold. In this section, we elaborate on the Dutch setting and provide
insight in how the calculations have been performed.
The Netherlands seems to be a good choice to perform calculations based
on our model. First, in The Netherlands, coalition governments are the
standard, considering that the Dutch multi-party democracy only has had
coalition governments since 1945 (Mu¨ller & Strøm, 2003). Also, The Nether-
lands has a tradition of majority coalitions. Furthermore, two of the issues
we highlight - procedures and flexibility - are important. Concerning pro-
cedures, the process of coalition formation is by far the longest in Western
Europe with an average of 70.6 days. This could denote an important role
for procedures. The first mover issue is relevant as it is characteristic for the
Dutch coalition practice that the biggest party gets the initiative to form
a coalition. Concerning flexibility, coalition agreements play an important
role in coalition negotiations: each cabinet agrees on such a document as
the course of action during their period of government. Data however show
different ideal policy positions of Dutch parties (e.g. De Vries, 1999; Van der
Brug, 1999) which implies compromises and hence flexibility of parties.
The calculations have been done with an algorithm that has been devel-
oped and reported in Sa´iz et al. (2007). In short, in the step-by-step case,
the algorithm determines the coalition position and preferences of parties for
all coalitions at each possible path. In this procedure, first the new positions
and coalition positions for all the possible two-party coalitions are computed.
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For each two-party coalition, the procedure builds up coalitions with n > 2
members adding new members one-by-one. If the maneuvering spaces of the
new member i and the members of S overlap, the negotiation positions (for
the new member and the coalition) are computed. If the new coalition S∪{i}
is a winning coalition, then preferences for each member are calculated. In
the simultaneous case, the number of possible coalitions is known given the
number of parties, and the coalitions are generated. For each coalition, the
procedure computes the coalition position and preferences. The computa-
tion of the negotiation positions uses an external nonlinear programming
algorithm.
We provide an example here to illustrate how the algorithms work, what
input they need, and what is their output. This example uses the Dutch elec-
tion result of 2003. As input for the model, we need ideal policy positions
of Dutch parties, and a weight and a radius for each political party. The
ideal policy positions are derived from a data set with policy positions of
Dutch political parties on 56 dimensions from 1998 and 2003 (Klingemann,
Volkens, Bara, and & Budge, 2006). Because the model is working with
spherical maneuvering spaces based on distance calculations, the data are
all scaled between 0 and 10. The weight of the parties is determined by the
amount of seats each party had in parliament (total of 150 seats). The radii
that model the flexibility of the parties is relatively arbitrary for illustrative
purposes and leave a degree of freedom for our analysis. In reality, each party
has its own radius which is dependent on the specific situation and which
might be subject to change. Due to the lack of empirical data on this aspect,
we have taken two different ways to determine the radius: a radius similar for
each party (in the 1998 and 2003 case) and a radius different for each party,
randomly generated (for the 1998 case). In the cases in which we have used
similar radii for all parties, the radii have been determined by optimizing the
case such that enough, but not too many, instances were found which could
help us investigate the hypotheses. For the 2003 case, Table 1 shows this
input. The names of the parties are the following:
CDA - Christian Democrats (Christen Democratisch Appel)
CU - Christian Union (Christen Unie)
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D66 - Democrats 66 (Democraten ’66)
GRL - Green Left (Groen Links)
LPF - List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn)
PvdA - Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid)
SP - Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij)
VVD - People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor
Vrijheid en Democratie)
Note that the SGP (Political Reformed Party) is not included in this
table, as it was not included in the dataset from Klingemann et al. (2006)
(in Appendix IV of Klingeman et al. (2006) is explained that the election
program for the collection of data was missing).
Table 1: Example based on data for 2003
Party Radius Weight
CDA 30 44
CU 30 3
D66 30 6
GRL 30 8
LPF 30 8
PvdA 30 42
SP 30 9
VVD 30 28
As output of the model, we only consider coalition positions of majority
coalitions of parties that have an overlap of their maneuvering spaces given
their ideal policy positions, i.e. of feasible winning coalitions. As said earlier,
the biggest party gets the initiative for coalition formation in The Nether-
lands. In 2003, this was the CDA. The majority coalitions with overlapping
maneuvering spaces containing CDA are included in Table 2. For each coali-
tion reached with a certain procedure, the distance between the coalition
position and the ideal position of the party are calculated. The {PvdA,
CDA} coalition leads to the same coalition position with both procedures as
no third party joins here. However, for a coalition between CDA, PvdA, and
LPF (e.g. {{CDA, PvdA}, LPF} and {CDA, PvdA, LPF}) procedure plays
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a role as different procedures lead to different distances. More generally, we
see in all the calculations done for this paper that procedure really makes a
difference: different procedures lead to different results.
Table 2: Distances from ideal points for 2003 example
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Seats Distance
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 20.52 - - - 20.07
{{CDA,PvdA}, SP} 95 - - - 24.92 29.39 - - 26.92
{{CDA,PvdA},LPF} 94 - - - 25.45 - - 29.24 23.69
{{CDA,SP}, PvdA} 95 - - - 26.04 29.42 - - 25.97
{{CDA,LPF},PvdA} 94 - - - 25.38 - - 29.15 23.86
Simultaneous Procedure
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 20.52 - - - 20.07
{CDA,PvdA, SP} 95 - - - 26.01 29.00 - - 26.47
{CDA,PvdA,LPF} 94 - - - 25.31 - - 28.62 24.59
Based on these distances, the preferences of the players can be calculated.
The closer the coalition position to the ideal position of a party, the more
the party will prefer this coalition and the procedure. Table 3 reports this.
As an example, CDA’s most favorite option is to cooperate with PvdA. If
CDA would cooperate with PvdA and SP, then the best procedure for CDA
would be to negotiate first with SP alone. The step-by-step procedure with
SP joining as last is CDA’s least preferred procedure for this coalition. Note
that we do not consider preferences of the parties not participating in the
coalition.
Table 3: Preference order for 2003
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Seats Preference order
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 1 - - - 1
{{CDA,PvdA}, SP} 95 - - - 2 2 - - 7
{{CDA,PvdA}, LPF} 94 - - - 5 - - 3 2
{{CDA,SP}, PvdA} 95 - - - 7 3 - - 5
{{CDA,LPF}, PvdA} 94 - - - 4 - - 2 3
Simultaneous Procedure
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 1 - - - 1
{CDA,PvdA, SP} 95 - - - 6 1 - - 6
{CDA,PvdA,LPF} 94 - - - 3 - - 1 4
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In reality, the coalition that formed was {CDA, VVD, D66}. Although
it is not the aim of this paper to predict which coalitions have occurred, we
can explain why this coalition did not appear in the results. According to
the model and, in particular, the adopted input, this coalition would not
be viable. That means that the adopted radii did not lead to an overlap
of the parties’ maneuvering spaces; the {CDA, VVD, D66} coalition is less
acceptable than the coalitions that appear in the table.
4 Model implications: empirical cases and
theoretical examples
To study the three hypotheses presented in Section 2, we provide empirical
cases and theoretical examples. The empirical cases are based on generated
data on which calculations are performed, as explained in Section 3. Also, we
present theoretical examples. We aim to present these cases and examples as
(counter-)instances which show whether the stated hypotheses hold. When
analyzing those cases, one should note that three issues are important in
determining a coalition agreement: weights of the players, distances between
members’ policy positions, and the amounts of flexibility parties have (the
maneuvering spaces). In other words, to determine whether a result is really
due to the phenomenon in the hypothesis, we should pay attention to these
three issues.
4.1 Implications for procedure
The first hypothesis says that being a first-mover in coalition negotiations is
advantageous. In the 2003 case presented above, we indeed saw that for the
LPF being the first mover was advantageous. When comparing the LPF’s
preference on the two step-by-step procedures it is involved in, it prefers
{{CDA, LPF}, PvdA} over {{CDA, PvdA}, LPF}. So, it prefers being a
first mover over being a late mover. A small counter example can be found
due to the PvdA that in the same coalition prefers to step in later. The data
of 1998 show a stronger counter example, as can be observed from Tables 4
and 5.
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Table 4: Weights and radius 45 for 1998 data
Parties
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
Radius 45 45 45 45 45 45
Seats 11 5 45 14 38 29
Table 5: Preference order for 1998 data
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Seats Preference order
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{{PvdA, SP}, CDA} 79 - 8 3 - - 2
{{PvdA,D66}, CDA} 88 - - 5 7 - 4
{{PvdA,CDA}, SP} 79 - 4 1 - - 7
{{PvdA,CDA}, D66} 88 - - 2 4 - 8
{{{PvdA, SP}, D66}, CDA} 93 - 5 10 9 - 6
{{{PvdA, SP}, CDA}, D66} 93 - 1 7 8 - 9
{{{PvdA,D66}, SP}, CDA} 93 - 9 11 5 - 6
{{{PvdA,D66}, CDA}, SP} 93 - 7 8 1 - 10
{{{PvdA,CDA}, SP}, D66} 93 - 2 6 8 - 9
{{{PvdA,CDA}, D66}, SP} 93 - 7 5 2 - 10
Simultaneous Procedure
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{PvdA, SP,CDA} 79 - 3 4 - - 1
{PvdA,CDA,D66} 88 - - 9 3 - 3
{PvdA,D66, SP,CDA} 93 - 6 12 6 - 5
In the 1998 case, PvdA was the biggest party and had to take the initiative
in coalition negotiations. For the three party coalition {PvdA, SP, CDA},
two step-by-step and one simultaneous procedures were considered as PvdA
always had to be a first mover. In the two step-by-step procedures, CDA
would be better off being a late instead of a first mover. Let i denote the
preference relation of party i. For this coalition, the preference order of CDA
is as follows: {PvdA, SP, CDA} CDA {{PvdA, SP}, CDA} CDA {{ PvdA,
CDA}, SP}. This also holds for SP, which in case of step-by-step formation
rather joins as last member in the negotiations. We can therefore conclude
that hypothesis 1 does not hold:
R1: Being a first mover is not always advantageous.
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4.2 Implications for flexibility
The second hypothesis states that being less flexible in coalition negotiations
is more advantageous. A search in the data did not provide a counter example
to this hypothesis. It was found that a decrease in a party’s flexibility always
seems to be in the party’s advantage. In other words, the intuition which
was provided earlier holds. As seen more easy in two-party coalitions, less
flexibility always leads to a more advantageous coalition agreement for a
party.
Although we did not find a counter-example in the Dutch data, we did
come up with a one-dimensional theoretical example which shows that being
less flexible can be a disadvantage.
Example 4.1 We consider a three-party example, in which parties 1 and
2 have the same weight, while the weight of party 3 is twice as big as the
weight of party 1 and 2, i.e.
N = {1, 2, 3}, w1 = w2, w3 = 2w2
The situation is illustrated in Figure 4. Since this is a one-dimensional ex-
ample, the ideal positions x∗1, x
∗
2 and x
∗
3 are points (denoted in Figure 4 by
squares) on a line, while the maneuvering spacesM1,M2 andM3 are intervals
(denoted in Figure 4 by two-headed arrows). We have
x∗1 = 0, x
∗
2 = 4, x
∗
3 = −2
All parties are assumed to be equally flexible and their radii are equal to
r1 = r2 = r3 = 6
Hence, the maneuvering spaces are
M1 = [−6, 6], M2 = [−2, 10], M3 = [−8, 4]
and their intersections (also two-headed arrows)
M1 ∩M3 = [−6, 4], M1 ∩M2 = [−2, 6]
M2 ∩M3 =M1 ∩M2 ∩M3 = [−2, 4] 6= ∅.
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Figure 4: Counter-example “being less flexible can be a disadvantage”. Ideal
points (squares) and maneuvering spaces (two-headed arrows)
Since M1 ∩M2 ∩M3 6= ∅, the necessary condition for coalition {1, 2, 3} to
be formed is satisfied. Let us consider the step-by-step procedure of forming
coalition {1, 2, 3}, in which first parties 1 and 2 form a coalition {1, 2}, and
then party 3 joins. The steps of the procedure are explained in Section 2.2.
The negotiation positions x
{1,2}
1 and x
{1,2}
2 of parties 1 and 2 are equal to
their ideal positions, because the ideal points lie in the intersection of the
maneuvering spaces, i.e.
x
{1,2}
1 = 0 = x
∗
1, x
{1,2}
2 = 4 = x
∗
2
Since the weights of parties 1 and 2 are the same and the coalition position
is the gravity center of the negotiation positions, we get
x{1,2} = 2 ∈M3
Next, party 3 joins proto-coalition {1, 2}. Because x∗3 and x{1,2} lie in the
intersection of the maneuvering spaces, the negotiation positions of party 3
and proto-coalition {1, 2} are equal to x∗3 = −2 and x{1,2} = 2, respectively.
Since the weight of party 3 is equal to the weight of {1, 2}, we get
x{{1,2},3} = 0 = x∗1
Hence, the step-by-step procedure of forming {{1, 2}, 3}, in which first parties
1 and 2 form a coalition, and then party 3 joins, leads to the coalition position
x{{1,2},3} which is the best possible position for party 1.
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Next, let us assume that party 1 becomes less flexible, that is, its new
radius decreases to r′1 = 3. All remaining components of the example are
unchanged. Then,
M ′1 = [−3, 3], M ′1 ∩M2 =M ′1 ∩M2 ∩M3 = [−2, 3]
We consider the same step-by-step procedure of forming {1, 2, 3} with the
new radius r′1 = 3. The new negotiation position y
{1,2}
1 of party 1 is the same
as before (equals x
{1,2}
1 ), since its ideal point lies in the intersection of the
maneuvering spaces. However, the new negotiation position y
{1,2}
2 of party 2
is different, i.e.
y
{1,2}
1 = x
∗
1 = 0, y
{1,2}
2 = 3.
The new position y{1,2}, as the gravity center of y
{1,2}
1 and y
{1,2}
2 with equal
weights w1 = w2, is now
y{1,2} =
3
2
∈M3
The new coalition position y{{1,2},3}, as the gravity center of the negotiation
positions y{1,2} and x∗3 = −2, with equal weights for {1, 2} and party 3, is
now
y{{1,2},3} = −1
4
Hence, the step-by-step procedure of forming {{1, 2}, 3}, in which first parties
1 and 2 form a coalition, and then party 3 joins, results now in the coali-
tion position y{{1,2},3} which is worse for party 1 than the coalition position
x{{1,2},3}, for the case where party 1 is more flexible, i.e.
x{{1,2},3} 1 y{{1,2},3}
This means that becoming less flexible made party 1 worse off.
To conclude, although the data have shown that less flexibility always
seems to be advantageous to a party, a theoretical counter example has illus-
trated how a decrease in flexibility can be a disadvantage for a party. Hence:
R2: When forming a k-party coalition, for k ≥ 3, being less flexible
is usually advantageous, but can theoretically be a disadvantage.
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4.3 Implications for power sharing
Hypothesis 3a argues that being in a minimal winning coalition is more
advantageous than being in an oversized coalition. We have found many
counter-examples in Dutch data which show that the hypothesis does not
always hold. We consider Dutch data after the 1998 elections (see Table 4).
Here, we change the radii for the parties and let the radius be different for
different parties. We get an instance as shown in Table 6. Table 7 shows
the preference order for this case. Note that under the step by step as well
as simultaneous procedure, PvdA finds the non-minimal winning coalition
formed by PvdA, VVD and D66 more attractive than the minimal winning
coalition {PvdA, VVD}.
Table 6: Weights and different radii for 1998
Parities
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
Radius 45 55 25 65 85 45
Seats 11 5 45 14 38 29
Concluding, we get the following result.
R3a: Forming a minimal winning coalition is not always advantageous.
The last hypothesis (3b) says that an increase of a party’s weight is disad-
vantageous for its coalition partners. One can show that forming a two-party
coalition with a stronger party is never advantageous to the coalition part-
ner. The intuition is that in such a ‘zero-sum’ situation, the larger party
will always be able to pull the coalition position to its own position, further
away from its partner. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily hold when form-
ing a larger coalition. We can illustrate this with the following theoretical
example.
Example 4.2 We consider the same situation as in Example 4.1 with party
1 being less flexible, i.e.,
N = {1, 2, 3}, x∗1 = 0, x∗2 = 4, x∗3 = −2
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Table 7: Preference order with different radii for 1998
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Number of seats Preference order
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{PvdA, V V D} 83 - - 3 - 1 -
{{PvdA, SP}, V V D} 88 - 4 12 - 5 -
{{PvdA,D66}, V V D} 97 - 10 1 11 6 -
{{PvdA, V V D}, SP} 88 - 8 7 - 4 -
{{PvdA, V V D}, D66} 97 - 11 2 10 2 -
{{{PvdA, SP}, D66}, V V D} 102 - 1 8 1 12 -
{{{PvdA, SP}, V V D}, D66} 102 - 2 11 2 10 -
{{{PvdA,D66}, SP}, V V D} 102 - 6 5 5 12 -
{{{PvdA,D66}, V V D}, SP} 102 - 9 4 7 11 -
{{{PvdA, V V D}, SP}, D66} 102 - 5 7 4 9 -
{{{PvdA, V V D}, D66}, SP} 102 - 9 6 6 7 -
Simultaneous Procedure
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{PvdA, V V D} 83 - - 3 - 1 -
{PvdA, SP, V V D} 88 - 7 10 - 3 -
{PvdA,D66, V V D} 97 - 11 2 8 2 -
{PvdA, SP,D66, V V D} 102 - 3 9 3 8 -
r′1 = 3, r2 = r3 = 6, w1 = w2, w3 = 2w2
M ′1 = [−3, 3], M2 = [−2, 10], M3 = [−8, 4]
M ′1 ∩M2 =M ′1 ∩M2 ∩M3 = [−2, 3]
As calculated in Example 4.1, the coalition position y{{1,2},3} results from the
step-by-step procedure of forming {{1, 2}, 3}, in which first parties 1 and 2
form a coalition, and then party 3 joins, is equal to y{{1,2},3} = −14 . Next,
let us assume that the weight of party 1 increases: it is twice as big as the
weight of party 2 and the same as the weight of party 3, i.e.,
w′1 = 2w2 = w3
The remaining components of the model remain unchanged. We consider
the same step-by-step procedure of forming {{1, 2}, 3}. The new negotiation
positions z
{1,2}
1 , z
{1,2}
2 , and coalition positions z{1,2}, z{{1,2},3} are now the
following:
z
{1,2}
1 = x
∗
1 = 0, z
{1,2}
2 = 3, z{1,2} = 1 ∈M3
z{{1,2},3} = −1
5
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Comparing the distance between coalition position y{{1,2},3} and the ideal
point x∗2 of party 2 and the distance between the new coalition position
z{{1,2},3} and x∗2, one can conclude that
z{{1,2},3} 2 y{{1,2},3}
It means that an increase of the weight of party 1 makes party 2 better off.
This gives the following result.
R3b: When forming a k-party coalition, for k ≥ 3, an increase of a
party’s weight may be an advantage for its coalition partner.
In order to show a pure effect of an increase of a party’s weight in Ex-
ample 4.2, somewhat artificially we have increased the weight of party 1,
keeping all remaining elements unchanged. This is of course not what hap-
pens in a parliament, since elections (usually) preceding coalition formation
fix the weights of the parties. However, it can be used by parties defining a
coalition formation strategy before elections. For example, in its campaign
a party may be less negative with respect to another party whose bigger
size might be beneficial. Nevertheless, although we believe that this result is
mainly of a theoretical nature, we have also constructed an instance using the
data. Consider the case of Table 6 that presents the 1998 data with varying
flexibility for the parties taking the real number of seats. The distance of the
ideal of D66 to the compromise of coalition {{{PvdA, SP}, D66}, V V D} is
52.25. Let us now hypothetically assume that SP increases its weight by 30,
while the other parties keep their original weights. Now the distance of the
ideal of D66 to the coalition position becomes 51.53. This means its position
improves due to an increase of another party.
5 Conclusions
In spite of the many unwritten laws and traditions during coalition formation
in countries as Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland,
political parties should be aware of the important role of the process of coali-
tion formation. In this paper, we have shown how several aspects of this
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coalition process play an important role for the result of the coalition nego-
tiations. We describe a formal model of coalition formation which considers
political parties as players with ideal policy positions and maneuvering spaces
denoting their flexibility to deviate from their ideal points. The output of
the model is a set of feasible coalitions, which have a majority and whose
members’ maneuvering spaces overlap. The model describes which coalition
position will be reached by the members given the procedure adopted.
We have focussed on three aspects of coalition formation: procedure,
flexibility, and power sharing. The following questions which political par-
ties may (and should) take into account when forming a coalition were under
study: Does procedure of coalition negotiations matter? Is it more advanta-
geous to be a first-mover in the coalition process? Is it better to be more or
less flexible in coalition formation? Should we invite more parties to join to
a (minimal) winning coalition or is it better to stay with the existing one(s)?
Is it better to form a coalition with a stronger party or rather with a smaller
one? Via empirical analysis with Dutch data and theoretical results, we have
arrived at several (counter-)examples. These counter-examples have shown
the importance of the process and give important implications for political
parties involved in coalition formation. Also, these results have implications
for future coalition research. We discuss both kinds of implications in this
concluding section.
First, procedure matters. When forming a coalition, political parties
should be aware of the important role procedure plays in determining the
result of the coalition. Our model has shown that procedure partly de-
termines which coalition point is agreed on. However, earlier research has
analyzed that there is not one procedure which is always best (De Ridder
& Rusinowska, 2008). This result contrasts the general practice of coalition
formation in which procedures are generally formalized in pre-determined
laws or traditions. Political parties can nevertheless benefit by manipulating
the procedure. Also, for coalition models, especially dynamic models, the
procedure should be taken into account (c.f. Grofman, 1982).
Related to procedure is the second conclusion that being a first mover
is not necessarily advantageous. This result is also surprising in the sense
that in many countries (e.g. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
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Austria) the tradition is that the largest party can start the negotiations and
determines who will negotiate first. Being involved early in the process is
considered an advantage. However, from the model it appeared that this is
not always the case. The rationale here is that, by studying coalition com-
promises the other coalition partners will reach without a party (assuming
complete information), this party can estimate whether this compromise is
close to its ideal position. If it is, it may pay to join later. If the compromise
is not close, it may be better for the party to join earlier in the process.
The third conclusion is that being less flexible is not necessarily advan-
tageous. In the data, we have found that being less flexible results in a
(pre-)coalition compromise which is closer to a party’s position. So, being
less flexible pays off. Nevertheless, we have presented a theoretical three-
party counter-example in which being less flexible is a disadvantage. In this
example, the first mover’s ideal position was somewhere between the ideal
position of the remaining two parties. Although being less flexible gave a
better pre-coalition outcome, the final coalition position was worse for the
party than the coalition position with the party being more flexible.
The final conclusions contradict the ideas of power sharing theories (as
minimal winning theory). It appeared that forming a minimal winning coali-
tion is not necessarily advantageous. Moreover, forming a coalition with a
stronger party is not necessarily disadvantageous. So, it might pay off to
share power with more and stronger parties than predicted by power sharing
theory. To explain this counter-intuitive finding, for the minimal winning
case it holds that new parties may determine a final coalition outcome closer
to a party’s ideal position, although this depends on the ideal positions of
the new parties. For the stronger partner case, a stronger party joining usu-
ally moves the pre-coalition compromise further from a party’s own ideal
position. However, a strong party may determine a final coalition position
which is closer to a party’s position. In that case, a strong partner may be
beneficial to cooperate with.
In sum, these four conclusions lead to the main message of the arti-
cle. With the paper, we have shown that the principles underlying coalition
practice and the assumptions and intuition around coalition theory do not
necessarily hold. Coalition dynamics, here, that is coalition procedure, being
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a first-mover, and policy flexibility, play a more important role than has so
far been generally acknowledged in the coalition literature (with exceptions
such as Brams, Jones & Kilgour, 2005, Warwick, 2005a, 2005b). We have
provided theoretical examples and empirical cases which confirm the thesis
that the coalition process matters. We aim to reach the agenda of coalition
research with this message. Due to the focus on making and illustrating this
message, we have neglected other aspects of the research. We suggest for
future research to investigate how to empirically determine a party’s flexibil-
ity, development of more dynamic coalition models, and empirical analyses
of more countries.
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